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PRINCIPLES AND APPROACHES TO TARGETING:
WITH REFERENCE TO THE INDONESIAN SOCIAL
SAFETY NET PROGRAMS
Sudarno Sumarto, Asep Suryahadi
Abstract
The potential benefits of accurate targeting are substantial because public expenditures
can be concentrated to the needy, thereby saving money and improving program
efficiency. However, targeting also entails administrative costs associated with
identifying, reaching, and monitoring potential beneficiaries. In addition, there are
also potential costs in the form of disincentive costs, stigma costs, and political
economy costs. The experience of the recent Indonesian social safety net programs
shows that targeting was one of the most difficult problems in the implementation of
these programs. As a result, the programs were plagued by the twin problems of
undercoverage and leakage.
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I.  BENEFITS AND COSTS OF TARGETING
In social safety net, social protection, or poverty reduction programs, targeting issues
are frequently among the most difficult problems to deal with during the
implementation of such programs. Nevertheless, targeting is almost always a
prominent feature of the designs of such programs because the potential benefits of
effective targeting are considerable. Targeting can concentrate expenditures allocated
to the programs on those who need them most, hence it can save money and improve
program efficiency.1 In addition, given the budgetary and time constraints facing
program implementers, it is highly desirable that expenditures on social sectors are
fine-tuned and well-targeted.
Figure 1 illustrates the benefits of accurate targeting. In the horizontal axis, individuals
are ordered from the poorest to the richest. The vertical axis, meanwhile, measures the
levels of income of these individuals. The dashed curve OR maps these individuals to
their income levels. The line PS represents the poverty line. Clearly individuals
between O and T are poor as their income levels are below the poverty line. Suppose
the government institutes a poverty elimination program by giving each and every
individual an income supplement by the amount of OP. A program like this, where all
individuals receive the benefits of the program, is called a “universal intervention”. As
a result of the intervention, the income curve shifts up to PQ so that nobody is poor as
no part of the new income curve is below the poverty line. The cost of this program is
area A plus area B plus area C.
If the objective of the program is to eliminate poverty, however, a universal
intervention achieves “too much”. Consider area C. This is the total amount of
benefits given to individuals whose income levels were already above the poverty line
even before the intervention. Hence, this area C can be considered as a “leakage”.
Now consider area B. This is the part of the benefits given to the poor which makes
their post-intervention income levels higher than the poverty line. Hence, this area B
can be considered as an “excess”. It is only area A which is considered as “efficient”.
This is the part of the benefits given to the poor which is just sufficient to eliminate
poverty.
                                                          
1 See Grosh (1994) and Hoddinott (1999).
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Figure 1.  The Benefits of Targeting
Now suppose an alternative poverty elimination program is designed with the
following features: (i) only the poor receive the benefits of the program, and (ii) the
benefits are just sufficient to lift their income levels to meet the poverty line. An
intervention like this is called a “targeted intervention”. With perfect targeting, the
post-intervention income curve is PUR and the cost of the program is only area A.
This means that compared to universal targeting, targeted intervention gives a saving
of area B plus area C, which can be considered as the benefits of targeting.
The examples illustrated in Figure 1, however, are extreme cases. In reality, a universal
intervention which gives each and every individual the same benefit rarely exists.
Similarly, a perfect targeted intervention is very hard to find. A much more common
variant of universal targeting is what is called a “broad targeting” program. This is a
program which provides general subsidies to certain goods or basic services which are
considered to matter more to the poor than to the non-poor. Experience from
Indonesia shows that spending on primary education tends to favor the poor, where
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the subsidy per capita declines as living standards rise. On the other hand, the
spending on tertiary education and hospitals results in the opposite pattern, while the
spending on community health center seems to have a neutral effect across socio-
economic levels (van de Walle, 1998).
While targeting has large potential benefits, it also always entails costs. The costs
include the administrative costs of identifying, reaching, and monitoring potential
beneficiaries. In addition, there are potential additional costs in the forms of
disincentive costs, stigma costs, and political economy costs.2 Disincentive costs are
possible economic losses due to disincentive effects. For example, a program provides
an income supplement of Rp20,000 for anybody whose income level is below
Rp100,000 per month. Those with income levels between Rp100,000 and Rp120,000
per month may reduce their working hours so that their income levels fall to slightly
below Rp100,000 per month, making them eligible to receive the benefits of the
program. Privately they become better off, but the society as a whole loses from lower
output and the increased costs of the program.
Stigma costs can arise when program beneficiaries lose their self-esteem because they
regard themselves as failures who have been forced to rely on government support. In
addition, non-beneficiaries may have negative attitudes toward beneficiaries and treat
them as second-class citizens. As a result, some of those who are actually eligible to
receive the benefits of a program may refuse to accept their entitlements. Hence, the
objectives of the program may not be achieved.
Political economy costs, meanwhile, are any loss of political support for a program
which may render the program ineffective. Often the poor are the most difficult and
costly to reach. On the other hand, the most vocal and organized groups in society are
often not the poor. If a program is well targeted, the latter group may voice their
opposition to the program and stifle its implementation. Faced by such a dilemma,
there is a danger that government will “go easy”, diverting the benefits to vocal and
organized groups, abandoning the program’s poverty alleviation objectives.
                                                          
2 See Subbarao et al. (1997).
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II.  APPROACHES AND MECHANISMS OF TARGETING
Normally, as the accuracy of targeting increases, the benefits from targeting will also
increase, but so will the associated costs.3 Hence, targeting should be carried out only
as long as the benefits exceed the associated costs. This, however, is easier said than
done. Often it is very difficult to quantify all the benefits and costs that are involved.
In addition, there are many practical questions which need to be answered regarding
the implementation of targeting. This section specifically deals with the question of
what targeting mechanisms are available to reach the intended beneficiaries of a
program.
The intended beneficiaries of social safety net, social protection, or poverty reduction
programs depend upon the objectives of the particular program. A food assistance
program will want to target its benefits to those within the community who are having
difficulties obtaining food out of their own resources. A health assistance program will
aim to provide free or subsidized medical benefits to those with health problems who
are also poor or who are unable to access medical services without outside assistance.
Meanwhile, a public works program will aim to provide employment opportunities to
either all of the currently unemployed or those among the unemployed who are also
poor. Normally a public works program is not designed to encourage the poor who are
already working to switch jobs. The strategy on how to reach these intended
beneficiaries should be a central element of any program design.
The targeting mechanism issue is also complicated by the fact that poverty is a very
fluid condition, where people frequently move in and out of poverty as a result of
various external factors. Many households, while not currently in poverty, recognize
that they are vulnerable and that events could easily push them into poverty in the
future — for example a bad harvest, a lost job, an unexpected expense, or an illness.
Therefore, targeting ‘transient’ or recent poverty may not provide a solution to the
time-invariant ‘chronic’ poverty.
In general there are two types of targeting mechanisms, administrative targeting and
market-based targeting. In administrative targeting, the beneficiaries of a program are
selected by the program implementers. Two approaches are commonly used in
administrative targeting, geographic targeting and household or individual targeting.
Geographic targeting simply means selecting particular regions or areas in which the
benefits of a program will be distributed. The selection is usually based on a set of
indicators, by which all regions are ranked from the most to the least eligible to be
included in the program.
Geographical targeting has its advantages and disadvantages. It is easy to implement
and to monitor, typically involves less fraud and much lower administrative costs than
other targeting mechanisms, and requires only limited information at the individual or
household level. However, some benefits will inevitably leak to the non-poor who
                                                          
3 See Besley and Kanbur (1990).
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reside in the targeted areas, while the poor who reside in non-target areas will not be
covered (Bigman and Fofack, 2000).
Household or individual targeting is basically an effort to identify households or
individuals who are deemed eligible to receive the benefits of a program. The selection
of households or individuals can be based on means testing or based on a set of
indicators as in geographic targeting. Means testing is a method of selecting individuals
or households based on whether they pass a certain predetermined threshold. The most
commonly used threshold is a certain level of income. In the example of disincentive
effects mentioned in the first section, a threshold per capita income of Rp100,000 per
month is used to screen individuals who are deemed eligible to receive an income
supplement of Rp20,000. The problem with such ‘direct targeting’ is that screening to
identify the poor is expensive. It requires extensive information gathering and
verification on the part of government administration.
These problems have led to a variety of schemes using indicator targeting or
intervention on the basis of the particular characteristics of the poor (‘characteristic
targeting’). This can be considered as a form of statistical discrimination where lack of
detailed information leads program providers to use average characteristics to target
intended beneficiaries. Examples of indicators or characteristics that are useful good
predictors of income include, ownership of durable goods, number of children, gender,
age, education level, land ownership, housing characteristics, or a combination of
several of these indicators. Data on these characteristics are relatively easier to obtain
than data on income. Therefore, the administrative costs of characteristic targeting are
much lower than the cost of direct targeting. In addition, they are also difficult to
manipulate in the short run, and hence have much lower level of leakage than direct
targeting.
Market-based targeting is also often referred to as self-selection targeting. With this
targeting mechanism, a program is designed in such a way so that only those who really
need assistance will choose to participate in the program. For example, a food security
program can provide in-kind benefits of very low quality food, available to anybody
who applies for it. The very low quality food is considered an inferior good, where
demand decreases with rising income. Although theoretically every one can apply for
the benefits, it is expected that only the poor will apply since such low quality food
will not be acceptable or desirable to the non-poor. Similarly, in a public works
program which provides a wage rate level below the prevailing market wage, it is
expected that only those who are really in need will apply to join the program. Such a
low level of wages discourages those who are already working from applying for the
program and maintains the incentive to take up regular employment when it becomes
available.4 This self-selection mechanism has certain advantages over administrative
criteria: it allows individuals to choose to participate or not and is more flexible to
unobserved household shocks than administrative criteria.5
                                                          
4 See Ferreira et al. (1999).
5 See Sumarto et al. (2000).
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In practice, a program can use or apply a single targeting mechanism or a combination
of two or more targeting mechanisms. For example, a combination of geographic and
household targeting can be used to reach the poor.6 Initially, the government project
staff may select those areas where the poor are most likely to be found. Obviously,
poverty incidence is an important indicator that can be used as a guide in this
selection of areas. Subsequently the government may choose those households which
are deemed eligible to receive the program benefits using means testing or particular
indicators or characteristics. Using means testing, a household is either included or not
included in the program based on the information and the criteria selected to determine
participation. In order to do this, a range of methods are available including measured
poverty status, community-based identification, and household self-reporting status.
Community-based identification allows communities to categorize households within
their own community as poor or vulnerable. This method is simple and inexpensive
and accuracy can be gained by the fact that poor households are a part of the local
community and can be readily identified. However there are certain disadvantages
with community-based identification: communities have a tendency to overstate the
number of poor households, community rankings are relative to community measures
so that such rankings might not be consistent at the national level, and there is a need
for some relatively skilled staff to oversee this process.
                                                          
6 Similarly, geographic targeting at the first stage can also be combined with self-selection or even with broad
targeting at the second stage.
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III. TARGETING IN THE INDONESIAN SOCIAL
SAFETY NET PROGRAMS
To demonstrate the way targeting be conducted, this section discusses the targeting
that has been used recently in the Indonesian Social Safety Net Program. Table 1 lists
the various social safety net programs established by the Government of Indonesia to
mitigate the social impact of the recent crisis. These programs were launched in early
1998, but many of them did not start until the second half of the year. These programs
were intended to help protect the pre-crisis poor as well as the newly poor as a result of
the crisis through a fourfold strategy: (i) ensuring the availability of food at affordable
prices, (ii) supplementing purchasing power among poor households through
employment creation, (iii) preserving the access of the poor to critical social services,
particularly health and education, and (iv) sustaining local economic activity through
regional block grant programs and the extension of small-scale credit.
In general, the targeting for these programs was based on a combination of geographic
and household targeting mechanisms, except for the subsidized rice program which
used only household targeting. The targeting for some programs was based on a
household classification created by the National Family Planning Coordinating
Agency (BKKBN). According to this classification, households are divided into four
socio-economic status groups: ‘pre-prosperous households’ (“keluarga pra-sejahtera” or
KPS), ‘prosperous I households’ (“keluarga sejahtera I” or KS I), KS II, and KS III. The
KS I to KS III categories are often lumped together as the KS or ‘prosperous’ category.
A household is defined as a ‘pre-prosperous’ household if it fails to satisfy one of the
following five conditions: (i) all household members are able to practice their religious
principles, (ii) all household members are able to eat at least twice a day, (iii) all
household members have different sets of clothing for home, work, school, and visits,
(iv) the largest floor area of the house is not made of earth, and (v) the household is
able to seek modern medical assistance for sick children and family planning services
for contraceptive users.  Suryahadi et al. (1999) find that there is a lack of correlation
between this official classification and consumption-based measure of poverty. They
find that while only 15 percent of the ‘prosperous’ households were ‘poor’, 75 percent
of the ‘pre-prosperous’ households were ‘non-poor’. On the other hand, 46 percent of
the ‘non-poor’ households were ‘pre-prosperous’ and 38 percent of the ‘poor’
households were ‘prosperous’.
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Table 1.  Areas, Major Programs, and Targeting of the Indonesian Social Safety Net Program
Area Program Description and Benefits Targeting FY 1998/99 FY 1999/00
Geographic None NoneFood Security OPK program: sale of subsidized rice to targeted households.
Eligible households can purchase 10-20 kg of rice at
Rp1,000/kg (market price is Rp2,500 – 3,000/kg) Household BKKBN list BKKBN list with
flexibility
Geographic Pre-crisis data Updated with regional
data
Community
Empowerment
PDM-DKE: a ‘community fund’ program that provides block
grants directly to villages for either public works or
revolving credit funds. Household Local decision making Local decision making
Geographic None, various
ministries
Urban areas, based on
employment
Employment
Creation
“Padat karya”: a loose, uncoordinated collection of several
‘labor intensive’ programs in various government
departments. Household Weak self selection Self selection
Geographic Old data on
enrollment
Poverty data updated
to 1998
Education Scholarships and block grants: providing
 Scholarships of Rp10,000/month for elementary (SD)
students, Rp20,000/month for lower secondary (SLTP)
students, and Rp30,000/month for upper secondary
(SMU) students
 Block grants to selected schools
Household School committees
applying criteria
School committees
applying criteria
Geographic BKKBN pre-
prosperous rates
Pre-prosperous rates
updated to 1999
Health JPS-BK: a program providing subsidies for
 Medical services
 Operational support for health centers
 Medicine and imported medical equipment
 Family planning services
 Nutrition (supplementary food)
 Midwife services
Household BKKBN list BKKBN list with
flexibility
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There have been a number of criticisms of the use of the BKKBN lists for targeting
purposes. The list does not capture transitory shocks to income as they are based on
relatively fixed assets (such as the type of floor in the house, possession of changes of
clothing). The lists also draws on non-economic criteria (the capacity of families their
to meet religious obligations).  In addition, the lists are compiled by relatively poorly
trained workers at the village level, so consistency across regions is not assured, and
the composition of the list is susceptible to changes by local government officials.7
The subsidized rice and the health programs explicitly used this BKKBN household
classification for targeting. The selection of recipients in the scholarship program was
also intended to take into account their BKKBN household status. Originally, eligible
recipients for some JPS programs were only KPS card holders, but for certain programs, for
example the OPK program, eligibility was extended to include KS I households as well.
The padat karya programs consisted of quite diverse programs and although specific
programs were targeted to particular areas (such as drought areas), the lack of
coordination meant that in effect there was little or no systematic geographic targeting
of this set of programs. Within these labor ‘intensive’ programs there were a variety of
disagreements about the desired characteristics of intended participants but typically
the beneficiaries were not chosen according to any fixed administrative criteria.
Hence, to the extent that there was targeting, it was primarily through self-selection.
Only those who were willing to work should have been able to receive the benefits.
In the scholarship program, scholarship funds were at first allocated to schools so that
“poorer” schools received proportionally more scholarships. In each school, the
scholarships were then distributed to individual students by a school committee, which
in theory consisted of the principal, a teacher representative, a student representative,
the head of the parent association as the representative of community, and the village
head. The selection of scholarship recipients was based on a combination of various
administrative criteria, which included a number of factors, such as household data
from school records, family BKKBN status, family size, and the likelihood of students
dropping out of school.8
School students in all but the lowest three grades of primary school were officially
eligible. In principle, students selected to receive the scholarships were supposed to be
from the poorest backgrounds. As a guidence, scholarships were to be allocated at first
to children from households in the two lowest BKKBN rankings. If there were more
eligible students than the number of scholarships available, then additional indicators
were to be used to identify the neediest students. These additional indicators included
the distance from home to school, physical handicaps, and those children coming from
large or single parent families. Also, a minimum of 50 percent of the scholarships, if at
all possible, were to be allocated to girls.
                                                          
7 See Sumarto et al. (2000)
8 Extensive monitoring of the education program revealed, however, that the parent representative played only a
minor role in validating the implementation of the criteria.  Decisions were mainly taken by the school officials.
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In the health programs, meanwhile, the free medical and family planning services
program was implemented by giving ‘health cards’ to eligible households. Eligibility
was also based on BKKBN household status. A health card given to a household could
be used by all members of the household to obtain free services from designated
hospitals, clinics, and health care centers for all medical and family planning purposes,
including pregnancy check-ups and child-birth services.
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IV.  MEASURING THE OUTCOMES OF TARGETING
In a program using targeted intervention, the success and failure of the program in
meeting its objective is determined very much by the accuracy of the targeting that
actually occurs in practice. A simple measure of targeting outcomes is illustrated in
Table 2. This reveals that for a program which provides benefits targeted to the poor,
there are two possible successful outcomes and two possible negative outcomes. The
successful outcomes are when the poor participate in the program and when the non-
poor do not participate in the program. Conversely the negative outcomes arise when
the poor do not participate in the program (an exclusion error) and when the non-
poor participate in the program (an inclusion error).
Table 2.  Targeting Outcomes
Poverty Status
Poor Non-poor
Participant
Success
10
Type II
(inclusion)
error
30 40
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
in
 P
ro
gr
am
Non-
participants
Type I
(exclusion)
error
10
Success
50 60
20 80 100
The numbers provided in Table 2 are taken from the implementation of the subsidized
rice program in Indonesia.9 The figures shows that the “success rate” of this program is
(10 + 50)/100 = 60 percent, while its “error rate” is (10 + 30)/100 = 40 percent. The
numbers in the figure can also be used as the basis for calculating two other widely
used targeting measures: “undercoverage” and “leakage”. Undercoverage refers to the
fraction of people who actually need assistance but who are not covered by a program,
while leakage refers to the fraction of program benefits which flow to those who
actually do not need assistance. In this subsidized rice program, the undercoverage is
10/20 = 50 percent, while the leakage is 30/40 = 75 percent.
Instead of undercoverage and leakage, sometimes it is easier to just assess program coverage
among the target and non-target population. For example, Table 3 shows the coverage of
the Indonesian social safety net programs across quintiles of per capita expenditure, where
the first quintile is defined as the poor. The subsidized rice program stands out as the
program with the highest level of coverage. More than a half of all poor households in
Indonesia reported receiving the benefits of this program, while more than a third of non-
                                                          
9 See Sumarto et al. (2001).
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poor households also reported receiving the benefits. The second highest coverage is found
in the nutrition program. Around 16 percent of both poor and non-poor households
reported receiving the benefits of this program. Meanwhile, two programs with the lowest
coverage are the primary and upper secondary school scholarships programs. In both, only
around 5 percent of poor students reported receiving the scholarships.
The coverage of the subsidized rice program indicates that nationally 40 percent of
over 50 million households all over Indonesia are estimated to have received the
benefits of this program during the six months evaluation period. However, the
distribution of the benefits of this program does not seem to have been specifically
directed towards the poor. The coverage of this program among the poor was 52.6
percent, while the coverage among the non-poor was relatively high at 36.9 percent.
In the employment creation programs, the data indicate that 5.6 percent of households
have at least one member who participated in a padat karya program. Program coverage
among poor households is 8.3 percent compared to 4.9 percent among non-poor
households. The significant participation of non-poor households in padat karya
programs  is probably a reflection of the level of wages offered by these programs. The
average daily wage received by the participants of padat karya programs was Rp6,073.
While this is significantly lower than the average daily wage in the construction
sector, which according to the 1999 National Labor Force Survey (Sakernas) was
Rp13,755, it was comparable to the daily wages in the food crop sector, which
averaged at Rp6,350. The level of wages received and the average number of working
day of participating households imply that each program participant on average
received benefits of around Rp27,500 per month from the program.
For the primary scholarships program, Table 3 shows that the program coverage among
poor students is only 5.8 percent, compared to 3.6 percent coverage among non-poor
students. In the lower secondary school scholarships program, the program coverage
among poor students is only 12.2 percent, compared to 7.5 percent coverage among
non-poor students. Meanwhile, in the upper secondary school scholarships program,
the program coverage among poor students is only 5.4 percent, compared to 3.3
percent coverage among non-poor students.
In the medical services program, the data indicate that of all the people who
underwent medical treatment, 6.3 percent used health cards to obtain free services.
Among the poor, the proportion of those who used health cards is 10.6 percent, while
among the non-poor 5.3 percent also used health cards to obtain the benefits of this
program. Meanwhile, the coverage of supplementary food for pregnant women and for
children under three is 15.9 percent. Among the poor, 16.5 received the benefits of
this program, while coverage among the non-poor is only slightly lower at 15.8 percent.10
                                                          
10 It seems that there is no relationship between receiving supplementary food and ownership of a health card. Of
those who received supplemental food, only 17 percent reported owning a health card.
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Table 3.  Coverage of Indonesian Social Safety Net Programs Across Quintiles of Expenditure
Program Coverage (%)
Poor Non-Poor
P r o g r a m Eligible
Recipients
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Total
Q2 - Q5
Total
Q1 - Q5
Ratio
Non-poor
to Poor
Subsidized Rice 50,385,444 52.64 46.24 41.71 35.76 24.33 36.90 40.09 0.70
Employment Creation 50,385,444 8.31 6.89 5.79 4.58 2.53 4.94 5.61 0.59
Primary School Scholarships 29,745,369 5.80 4.84 4.02 3.52 2.04 3.60 4.03 0.62
Lower Secondary School Scholarships 10,394,621 12.15 10.31 8.34 6.73 4.85 7.53 8.42 0.62
Upper Secondary School Scholarships 6,430,146 5.40 5.06 3.32 3.04 1.96 3.32 3.71 0.62
Medical Services 27,567,138 10.60 7.24 6.30 4.52 3.09 5.28 6.33 0.50
Nutrition 19,970,948 16.54 16.64 16.38 15.94 14.24 15.79 15.94 0.95
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Undercoverage and leakage can be recalculated from coverage among the target and
non-target population. Undercoverage is calculated as one minus coverage among the
target population. Meanwhile, leakage is equal to coverage among the non-target
population times the number of non-target population divided by coverage among the
target population times the number of target population plus coverage among the non-
target population times the number of non-target population. Overall, Table 3
indicates a large degree of undercoverage as well as considerable leakage in the
Indonesian social safety net programs.
Assessing targeting outcomes based on the coverage among the target and non-target
population perhaps does not do justice to the program implementers. The results may
also be sensitive to the threshold separating the target and non-target population.
Hence, assessing targeting outcomes based on the coverage among several groups in
the population may give a more comprehensive picture of the targeting efforts.
Figure 2 shows the coverage across quintiles relative to the level of coverage at the
poorest quintile. Hence, a steeper curve indicates a sharper targeting across per capita
expenditure. It appears that the best and worst targeting are both found in the health
programs. The medical services program has the sharpest targeting, while the nutrition
program has the least effective targeting. In the medical services program, coverage
dropped sharply in the second quintile and then dropped gradually from the third to
the richest quintile. Actually, the coverage of the employment creation program at the
richest quintile relative to the poorest quintile was almost as low as that in the medical
services program, but the drops in the program coverage across quintiles were more
gradual. There was also a notable drop in the coverage of the upper secondary school
scholarship program from the second to the third quintile.
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Figure 2.  Program Coverage of Various JPS Programs Relative to Q1
In the sale of subsidized rice program, coverage at the highest quintile is still quite
high, with almost a quarter of the households in the richest group still receiving the
program benefits. This is almost half of the level of coverage at the poorest quintile.
Meanwhile, the proportion of households at the richest quintile that participated in a
padat karya program is 30 percent of the participation at the poorest quintile. For other
programs, coverage at the highest quintile relative to coverage at the lowest quintile is
35 percent for primary school scholarships, 40 percent for lower secondary school
scholarships, 37 percent for upper secondary school scholarships, 29 percent for
medical services, and 86 percent for the nutrition program.
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V. LESSONS LEARNED FROM INDONESIA’S
TARGETING EXPERIENCE
Targeting the beneficiaries of social safety net, social protection, or poverty reduction
programs requires detailed administrative guidance as well as community involvement
if it is to be both effective as well as socially and politically acceptable. The previous
section, which discussed the issue of targeting in the Indonesian social safety net
programs, suggests that there are several useful lessons to be learned about the ways in
which targeting does or does not have the desired effect.
First, the Indonesian experience shows that the capacity of the government or donors
to respond to shocks with effective geographic targeting was hampered by a lack of up
to date, complete, and accurate data. This is why reliable information is vital. Static
administrative targeting is unable to catch the newly poor or shocked households.
When the crisis hit Indonesia, there were conflicting projections and differing
assessments of the probable social impact. A well-designed, publicly accessible, real-
time information system  might have assisted those efforts to address the needs of
either the traditionally poor or the newly poor resulting from the crisis. Such a system,
complemented by data from other organizations, including NGOs and donor agencies,
could play a key role in combating the negative effects of a crisis.
Second, designing and implementing large social safety net programs in a crisis
situation requires institutional commitment at the central government level, supported
by clear objectives and simple design. Implementation in the regions depends upon the
capacity of local government and local community groups. At this level, clear
targeting criteria and a reliable decision-making process are crucial to the effectiveness
of the program.
Third, although a simple design is important, there must still be some allowance for
local flexibility in countries of the size and complexity of Indonesia. The OPK program
is an example of a crisis initiative that worked relatively well. It had a simple design
using the BULOG distribution channels to provide rice at subsidized prices to those
with a BKKBN ‘poor card’. However, the experience revealed that centrally planned
administrative guidelines often proved socially unacceptable at the community level.
Pressure at the local level for a ‘fairer’ distribution of the rice was overwhelming, since
the ‘almost poor’ or the ‘newly poor’ families had no official entitlement to the
subsidized rice. These arguments are quite compelling and raise important questions
about the structure of ‘optimal’ targeting. It may well be that communities knew better
than the central government and that the official classification may not have captured
those who really needed the rice within any given community. Hence it is possible
that some of what was recorded as going to those who are “non-eligible” is not really
mis-targeting, but is a justifiable correction of the official eligibility criteria.
However, it is also possible that local social pressures have led to uniform or equal
distribution simply as the only allocation that is perceived to be ‘fair’. The danger is
that this may result in a simple ‘equal’ distribution which, given the fixed total amount
of rice available, results in a lesser benefit for the poor. In the fiscal year 1999/2000,
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the procedures for determining eligible households were expanded to allow for local
flexibility and the addition of households to the list, combined with procedures for
publicizing such a list (for example, through discussion at a local open meeting). This
was intended to allow necessary local flexibility while at the same time preventing a
completely uniform distribution. It appears that the emergence of flexibility during the
implementation of this program actually improved targeting and in April 2000 the
program design was changed to take this into account.
Fourth, one lesson to emerge from the employment creation programs in Indonesia  is
that in order to be effective wage rates should be set below the prevailing market rate.
This will allow for the element of  ‘self selection’ since only those in serious difficulty
will be willing to work for the low wages being offered.
Fifth, a notable feature of the coverage and targeting of the various social safety net
programs in Indonesia has been the heterogeneity of performance both across programs
as well as across regions. Three factors have presumably contributed to this: (i)
different types of program design, (ii) variation in the scale of budget allocations across
programs and regions, and (iii) local or regional capacity in program implementation.
In addition, other factors such as active monitoring and supervision by communities
may also enhance the performance of a program in a particular region.
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VI.  CONCLUSION
Targeting is very important in order to achieve cost effectiveness in social safety net,
social protection, and poverty reduction programs, but it is not nearly as easy as is
often suggested. Besides administrative costs, targeting also entails additional costs in
the forms of disincentive costs, stigma costs, and political economy costs. Therefore, it
is possible that a targeted intervention becomes more costly than a universal one.
Targeting is only considered beneficial when the benefits outweigh the costs.
We have shown how targeting was applied in practice. The Indonesian social safety
net programs were intended to protect both the traditionally poor as well as the newly
poor who were unable to cope with impact of the crisis without external assistance. In
general, the targeting for these programs was based on a combination of geographic
and household targeting mechanisms, except for the subsidized rice program which
used only household targeting.
Lessons from these programs indicate that targeting the beneficiaries of a program
requires detailed administrative guidance as well as community involvement if it is to
be both effective as well as socially and politically acceptable. Effective geographic
targeting requires up to date, complete, and accurate data, but even when such data are
available, static administrative targeting will still be unable to catch the newly poor or
shocked households. Clear targeting criteria and a reliable decision-making process are
crucial to the effectiveness of a program. However, although a simple design is
important, there must still be some allowance for local flexibility in countries of the
size and complexity of Indonesia.
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